

Below, I describe a series of papers that stem from my current research in which I extend some central lines of thought in new directions:

In a paper titled “A Defense of Item Awareness”, I develop an epistemologically motivated defense of the thesis that all perceptual experience, veridical or not, must have an object of awareness. I argue that representationalist views that reject this thesis are unable to explain how a hallucination can grant us knowledge of how sensible qualities—colors, for instance—*look*. For consider this simple illustration: a visit to Madame Tussauds is sufficient to teach me what Mick Jagger looks like because the wax replica shares many of its sensible features with the man. But, now, the question arises, how can a representation of a color grant knowledge of what a color looks like, without the representation actually being colored itself? If hallucinations can provide knowledge of the qualitative nature of colors—which I argue they can—we need a view on which colors are in fact instantiated in hallucination. This is incompatible with the representationalist’s claim that experiences can have rich phenomenology in the *absence* of any sensible items of awareness.

Mark Johnston, in “The Obscure Object of Hallucination” (2004), argues that hallucinations make us aware of uninstantiated sensible profiles. But if uninstantiated profiles are abstract entities, it is unclear how an awareness of such entities can do the phenomenological and epistemic work that Johnston wants it to do. In a paper titled “Instances without Bearers: Making Sense of Hallucinations,” I argue that if we are to give a compelling account of hallucination, we must treat this class of delusive experiences as making us aware of actual, concrete instances of sensible qualities. The question that arises, though, is how one can be aware of an instance of a sensible quality in the absence of any physical object that *has* the quality in question. In response, I provide an account of property instantiation on which instances of a property can exist independent of having any bearers. This proposal is to be distinguished from a traditional trope theory on which property-instances are fundamental, independently existing particulars. The problem for this kind of trope theory is that it is unable to provide a compelling criterion of individuation for the tropes it posits. I argue that the advantage of the traditional substance-accident framework is that it provides us a straightforward account of individuation. Instances, or particular accidents, are individuated in terms of the particular substances that they depend on. The mistake that the traditional metaphysicians are guilty of, however, is the insistence that the *only* way in which accidents can depend on substances is by inhering in them.

In “Space Occupation and Particularity,” I argue against a Strawsonian view of particularity on which particulars must exclude other particulars from existing at the same location. This criterion, if valid, would exclude instances of qualities as genuine particulars that are distinct from the material objects that they modify, because an instance of roundness and an instance of blueness do not spatially exclude each other when they comprise the roundness and blueness of one and the same beach ball. In defense of the claim that these property instances are genuine particulars, I argue that spatial *exclusion* is not a good criterion of particularity. For spatial exclusion requires spatial occupation and only some particulars *occupy* or *fill up* space – holograms, rainbows and shadows are particulars that do not fill up the space at which they are located; consequently, they do not exclude other particulars from occupying the same space. In order to accommodate these sorts of particulars, I argue that spatial *location*—not spatial exclusion—is the best criterion of particularity. On this criterion, instances of qualities naturally fall into the category of genuine particulars.

So far, I have focused on the nature of sense perception, and have argued that ordinary perception acquaints us with over-determined sensible qualities. In future work, I intend to extend my view to cover the case of bodily sensations, arguing that bodily sensations are best thought of as *jointly* determined by minds and material bodies. It has typically been assumed that pains, as quintessentially mind-dependent phenomena, must be *in* the mind (or in the brain) if they are located anywhere at all. But, in “The Locatedness of Pains” I argue that this view is unsatisfying. For it seems essential to a subset of pains—the bodily ones—that they are located in parts of our physical body: the ache that I feel after a strenuous game of tennis, for instance, is located in my shoulder, not in my mind (or brain). I show that the traditional view results from wrongly applying a notion of dependence-as-inherence to the mind: on this view, if a pain depends on the mind, it must inhere in the mind. But, this is the wrong notion of mind-dependence to make use of. My ache depends *on* my mind—not because

it is *in* my mind—but rather, because it depends on my awareness of it. But if this is what it takes for the pain to be mind-dependent, it can still be *located* in my shoulder. The existence of a pain, then, is *jointly* secured by the fact that someone is enjoying a pain experience *and* the fact that there is a body part for the pain to reside in. This reveals the possibility of the genuine locatedness of an essentially subjective phenomenon.

Finally, an important component of my research that I intend to develop further in the future pertains to historical views of the relation between substances and their qualities:

In “Berkeley on Resemblance,” I argue against a widely accepted interpretation of the arguments that Berkeley presents in *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* for the mind-dependence of the sensible qualities. Most interpreters have suggested that the so-called relativity arguments rely on the crucial premise—commonly referred to as the Likeness Principle—that an idea can only ever resemble another idea. In this paper, I argue that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Berkeley explicitly relies on the *conclusion* of the relativity arguments in defending the Likeness Principle itself. So, unless we are willing to attribute to Berkeley an instance of blatantly circular reasoning, we must offer a distinct reading of the structure of the relativity arguments – one which does not include the Likeness Principle as a premise. I go on to discuss how this interpretive finding reshapes our understanding of the disagreement between Berkeley and Locke on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

In “Two Views on Inherence,” I explore two historical accounts of the nature of sensible qualities and the relations they bear to the substances in which they inhere. Some early modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Locke are committed to the view that accidents, being little more than modifications of a substance’s essence, cannot exist independent of their bearers. Inherence, on this kind of view, is to be understood as a kind of property reduction, where inherent properties—accidents—are ontologically dependent on the substance’s essential attributes. According to an older discussion from the medieval period, inspired by treatments of the phenomenon of transubstantiation in the Eucharist, qualities such as color are thought to have an existence that is ultimately independent of the substance in which the quality inheres. In carrying out a comparative investigation of these two views of inherence, I use some notions from contemporary metaphysics—such as ontological dependence and fundamentality—to draw out some of the insights of both the medieval and early modern philosophers.